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NATURE OF THE CASE
This action involved the foreclosure of a mortgage against
a subdivision known as LAKEVIEW TERRACE SUBDIVISION, brought by the
appellant.

The District Court of Davis County awarded eight (8)

lien claimants a first priority of an aggregate $44,732.86 over the
appellant's Trust Deed from which ruling the aopellant aooeals.
The respondent-cross apoellant, Child Brothers, Inc., aooeals from
the dismissal of its Crossclaim against defendant C. N. Zur.del and
Associates and Mountain Springs Construction Company of Utah,

for

failure of warranty for orooerty deeded to Child Brothers Inc.,
and for damages incurred to Child Brothers,

Inc.,

for its work per-

formed on Lakeview Terrace Subdivision.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On January 12, 1978, the trial court heard all motions
for Summary Judgment, and thereafter on January 24, 1978, awarded
eight (8)
Deed,

lien claimants first priority over the aooellant's Trust

and dismissed all Counterclaims and Crossclaims in this action.

Thereafter, on February 1, 1978, the Court again ordered Summary
Judgment for the respondents for their liens amounting to $44,732.86,
and dismissed all counterclaims and Crossclaims in the action without
~avlng

taken any testimony.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
It is from the February l,

1978, Order dismissing all Cross-

claims and Counterclaims that Child Brothers,
remand to

Inc.,

seeks reversal and

the lower court that a trial may be held on its Crossclaim

against C. N. Zundel and Associates and Mountain Springs Construction
Company of Utah.

Child Brothers, Inc., further seeks that the Court

uphold the trial court's determination giving it and the other lien
claimants first priority over the Trust Deed of the appellant.

FACTS OF THE CASE
On November 15, 197 3 Child Brothers,

Inc.,

(hereinafter re-

ferred to as Child) commenced the first work that it oerformed on the
subject property known as the Lakeview Terrace Subdivision, by doing
pipeline, water system, storm drains and sewer system work.
sition of Eugene Child,

p. 5).

(Depo-

The work which was performed by Child

was performed prior to the recording of the Trust Deed between Zundel
and Associates

(hereinafter referred to as Zundel) and First of Denver

Mortgage Investors

(hereinafter referred to as FDMI), which Trust Deed

covered the subject property and was recorded on February 19,

1974.

Child continued to work on the subject property throughout the years
1974, 1975 and 1976.

During the period between March and June,

Pat Sinclair of Mountain Springs Construction Company of Utah
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(hereinafter referred to as Mountain Springs), the successor in
interest to Zundel, persuaded Eugene Child, president of Child
Brothers to take a Warranty Deed to 2 loG on the subject property
in order that Mountain Springs could continue with the work on the
project.

(See Deposition of Eugene Child p. 17).

In June, 1976,

a check in the amount of $13,210.00 along with a Warranty Deed to
two (2) lots in the subject subdivision, were given to Child for
the obligation owing to it by Zundel and Mountain Springs in the
approximate sum of $22,000.00.

(Deposition of Eugene Child p. 19).

Eugene Child was informed by both Pat Sinclair of Mountain Springs
and a Mr. Kenyon Gurr of Security Title, who was doing the title
work for Mountain Springs on the subdivision, that there was a
$12,000.00 mortgage or a 70%

selling price mortgage, whichever was

greater, on the property, and that by taking the lots Child would
be assured of receiving all the money due him.
Eugene Child p.23 through 26).

(Deposition of

However, neither Mr. Sinclair nor

Mr. Gurr informed Eugene Child that the title to the property would
be worthless within a week's time because there was a default provision in the Trust Deed which required the $12,000.00 or
price to be paid by July l,
tically revert back to FDMI.

7~/o

selling

1976 or else the property would automa(Deposition of Eugene Child p. 27).

Based upon the representations of Mr. Gurr and Pat Sinclair,
Child took the Warranty Deed to the lots and thereafter decreased the
balance owlng to it by Zundel/Mountain Springs by approximately
$22,000.00.

A release of all liens and claims was recorded on June 22,

1976, which was signed by Eugene Child on behalf of Child Brothers
Inc.,

Sponsored
by theMr.
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization
the Institute of Museum
and Library
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(Deposition of Eugene Child p. 23).

Thereafter Child,

continued to

work on the project and did its last work on October l,
sition of Eugene Child p. 33).
by Child on November 30,

1976.

(Depo-

A Notice of Lien was thereafter filed

1976.

Zundel conveyed its interest in the subject property to
Mountain Springs on August 8, 1975.
Spring were the same individuals

The shareholders of Mountain

(with the exception of C. N. Zundel)

as the limited partners of Zundel and Associates with Pat Sinclair as
the new president and executive officer of Mountain Springs.

Child

was not informed of the change in ownership of the property at the
time it occurred, but discovered the transfer at a much later date.
(Deposition of Eugene Child pp. 14 and 20).

At all times,

Child was

requested to continue its work by the parties who appeared to be the
same personnel, with only a change in name.

Child never opened a new

account with Mountain Springs, but merely transferred the balance
owing to it from Zundel work to Mountain Springs.
The appellant commenced this action upon the default of
Mountain Springs on the Notffidue and owing to it which were secured
by the subject property.

On November 30,

1977, Child entered this

suit and Crossclaimed against Zundel and Mountain Springs for the
money due it for the work performed,

and also for failure of warranty

on the two lots which were conveyed to Child.
The minute entries of December 8,

(R-428).

1977 and December 12,

1977 stated that the appellant would foreclose on the procerty for
$1,900,000.00,
on December 20,

and take no deflciency.
1977,

(R-443 and 453).

Thereaftec

the trial court entered Judgment and Decree of

Foreclosure wherein appellants were granted Judgment for $2.358, 396.c:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

but that appellants would

only

$1,900,000.00 of its Judgment.

look to the subject property for
(R-488)

Thereafter the

subject

property was sold on January 19, 1978 at a Sheriff's Sale with the
appellant , F.D.M.I., being the sole bidder for the subject property
and bidding the amount of its Judgment against the subject property
in the amount of $1,900,000.00.

(R-637 and 641)

The trial court

thereafter determined the priority of liens and placed the lien claimants in a first priority position over the Trust Deed of the appellant.
The appellant thereafter amended its bid to the amount of $1,944,732.86.
(R-614, 627 and 629)

The trial court thereafter, on February lst,

dismissed all Crossclaims and Counterclaims (R-618, 620, 633,
without any hearing or notice to the respondent/
Child Brothers,

Inc.

and 645)

crossclaimant,

(See Affidavit of Randy Ludlow, attached hereto).
ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE APPELL4\NT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED
SINCE THE APPELLANT HAS RECEIVED THE BENEFITS
OF ITS JUDGMENT.

No matter which way this court rules as to the priority of
the lien claimants' claims and the Trust Deed of the appellant,

the

lien claimants will still be entitled to $44,732.86 of the $1,944,732.86
bid by the appellant for the subject property.
ber 8,

The appellant on Decem-

1977, and on December 12, 1977, stipulated and agreed, as noted

ln those Minute Entries, that it would only look to the subject
property for the sum of $1,900,000.00.

(R-443 and 453)

Thereafter,

on December 20,

1977, the trial court entered a Judgment and Decree

of Foreclosure,

(R-488) wherein the appellant was granted Judgment

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law
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noted that the appellant was to receive only $1,900,000.00 from the
sale of the property, which $1,900,000.00 had been established in
the Minute Entries previously referred to.

At the foreclosure sale,

held on January 19, 1978, the appellant bid the sum of $1,900,000.00.
The appellant in actuality and effect had stipulated and been awarded
by the trial court a Judgment in the amount of $1,900,000.00.

The

appellant's claim had been fully satisfied at the foreclosure sale.
The trial court thereafter on January 24,

l978,adjudged

the mechanic's liens as having priority over the appellant's Trust
Deed.

(R-614

).

Thought the appellant was not obligated to bid in

the amount of the lien claimants' claims,

the appellant amended its

bid to the sum of $1,944, 732.86, which amount pays the Judgment of
all lien claimants and the appellant.

When a party consents to a

Judgment or accepts the benefits of a Judgment,
appealing to this Honorable Court.
15 P2d 631 (1932),

it is precluded from

See Cornia v. Cornia, 80 Ut 486,

and Dawson v. Board of Education of Weber Countv,

118 Ut 452, 222 P2d 590 (1950).

The appellant had consented to a

Judgment in the amount of $1,900,000.00 and had,

as bidder to the

property, received the benefit of its Judgment.

The appellant has

the right to receive its Judgment in the amount of $1,900,000.00.
The $44,732.88 excess which the appellant bid, under which it had no
obligation to bid but chose to add to its original bid, belongs to
the lien clalmants herein.

The entire amount as sought by both the

lien claimants and the appellant having been bid,
parties have been satisfied.

the clalms of all

The appeal herein should be

dismissed with the appellant ordered to pay the $44,732,86
it

accordingl~

which

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT II.

CHILD BROTHERS, INC. 'S LIEN TAKES PRIORITY
OVER THE TRUST DEED OF THE APPELLANT.

Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-5 states as follows:
"Priority--Over other encumbrances.-- The liens herein provided
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of
the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground
for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over
any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached
subsequently to the time when the building, improvement or
structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished
on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance
of which the lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded
at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced,
work begun, or first material furnished on the ground."
The first work performed in this matter by Child was performed on November 15, 1973.

(Deposition of Eugene Child, Exh. 1)

This work was done three months prior to the filing of appellant's
Trust Deed on February 19, 1974.
was digging holes,

Work which was performed by Child

locating sewer and water lines,

and laying stakes

to mark the lines, which work was performed with the engineers of
the project.

(Deposition of Eugene Child,

p. 5, 48 and 49)

The work

of Child, by statute, has priority over the Trust Deed of the apoellant since it was commenced prior to the filing of apoellant's Trust
Deed.

The work of Child is outside the scope of Aladdin Heating Cor-

poration v. Trustees of the Central States, 563 P2d 82 (1977 Nev.)
as cited by the appellant, which case held that where there is no
actual on-site construction on real property, mechanic's liens could
not relate back to the time before there was any "visible signs of
constructlon to inform prospective lenders inspecting the premises
that llens had attached."

At P2d 84.

In the case before this court,

there were actual signs of construction work which would place any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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person inspecting the property on notice of the commencement of
construction.

The work of Child on November 15,

1973, had Placed

the world on notice of the commencement of its work and of its
lien.
This case also does not fall under the doctrine as set
forth in Western Mortgage Loan Corporation v. Cottonwood Construetion Company, 18 U2d 409,
appellant.

424 P2d 437

(1967)

as expounded by the

This Court stated at P2d 439,

"To tack the liens for labor or materials that went into the
construction of the house to the liens that may have arisen
for labor and materials furnished in off-site improvements in
connection with the laying out and construction of facilities
used in connection with the subdivision as a whole would be
going beyond the intent of the statute. The problem is one
of notice.
The presence of materials on the building site
or evidence on the ground that work has commenced on a structure or preparatory ~hereto is notice to all the world that
liens may have attac~ed.
However,
the off-site construction
in developing the s~bdl~~slon for building sites would not
necessarily bring to the attention of a lender that someone
is claiming a lien on a particular lot in the subdivision.
This is especially true as in this case, where the lender
advanced money to build a home long after the subdivision had
been laid out and developed.
It is apparent that the persons
who supplied labor or materials for the construction of roads,
sewers, etc., could have filed liens
for unpaid balances due
them, if any. The erection of the home was separate and severable from the earlier work in developing the subdivision."
Based upon the factual situation and language set forth in
Western Mortgage Loan Corporation,
to the

situa~ion

that case is totally inapolicable

presented to the court herein.

is foreclosing an entire subdivision,

The apoellant herein

not a oarticular house.

Child

is claiming a lien on the entire area being forclosed by the ao9ellant
not a lien against an individual home as was the case in Western Mortgage Loan Corporation.

The appellant was on notice in this

mat~er.
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while there was no notice to the lender in Western Mortgage and Loan.
When an entire subdivision is being foreclosed,

as was the case in

this matter, off-site improvements, which relate to the entire subdivision, would place a lender on notice of their existence.

The

notice requirement that was set forth in Western Mortgage Loan Corporation has been met by Child in this matter, making the Western
Mortgage Loan case inapplicable in this situation.
The problem which must be decided by this court in determining the priority of the lien of Child to the Trust Deed of the
appellant rests upon the effect of the release of all liens and
claims recorded on June 22, 1976.
Exh. 3)

(Deposition of Eugene Child,

In Boise Cascade Corporation v. Stephens, 572 P2d 1380,

(1977 Utah), this court addressed the question of
"When a materialman signs a lien waiver for material furnished
and thereafter furnishes additional material on the same job,
does the priority date for the subsequent material relate back
to the date of first delivery?" At P2d 1380.
This court answered this question in the affirmative, noting certain
limitations.

The facts in

this particular matter show that Child

falls within the doctrine set forth in Boise Cascade Corporation.
The facts previously noted are:
1.

Child commenced work on the project on November 15, 1973.

(Deposition of Eugene Child,
2.

Exh. 1).

Child continued working on the project continuously

throughout the years 1974, 1975 and 1976 and performed its last work
on October 1,

1976.

(Deposition of Eugene Child and Exh. 1 and 2

contained therein)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3.

Child was unaware of the assignment of the property

from Zundel to Mountain Springs, and upon discovery, was informed
by Mountain Springs that they were taking over the account of Zundel.
No new account was opened for Mountain Springs but merely the account
of Zundel was transferred to them.

(Deposition of Eugene Child pp.

14 and 20; also Exh. 1 and 2)
4.

The principal individuals involved in the project with

Zundel were the same people involved in the project with Mountain
Springs.

(Brief of appellant p. 2)
Under the facts set forth above, Child meets the require-

ments set forth in the Boise Cascade Corporation case, but there is
also a policy reason as to why Child should have priority over the
appellant's Trust Deed.

Eugene Child was informed by Mountain Springs

that the only way

which he could obtain his money was by taking a

deed to two lots.

After a considerable amount of Persuasion and

pleading from Pat Sinclair of Mountain Springs, Child took a Warranty
Deed to lots in the project,
lien.

and thereafter executed the

(Deposition of Eugene Child pp. 23 through 27)

rel~ase

of

Child was not

forewarned by Mountain Springs or the individual doing the title work
for Mountain Springs on the subdivision, Mr. Kenyon Gurr,

that the

Warranty Deed would be worthless within ten (10) days because title
would revert back to FDMI because of the mortgage provisions.
sition of Eugene Child p. 27)

(De?o-

Child had thus traded a valuable lien

priority for a worthless piece of ?aper.

Justice Crockett in Boise

Cascade Corporation stated in his concurring opinion,

at P2d 1382,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"A primary purpose of the lien statues is to guard against a

laborer (or a material supplier) from working on a building and
being cheated of the reward of his labor and thus avoiding evil
consequences to him, his family, and the economy generally."
Child had been literally cheated out of his superior position by
Mountain Springs.

Such conduct by Mountain Springs should not be

allowed, especially when Child has met the requirements as set forth
in the Boise Cascade Corporation case.
It should be noted that Child and the appellant had entered
into a Stipulation in January of 1978 wherein Child stipulated to being
in a second priority position.

At the hearing on January 12, 1978,

the Boise Cascade Corporation case was produced by the attorney for
the respondent, Bland Brothers, which case the attorney for Child had
failed to find in its research and was unaware of at the time of
entering into the Stipulation.

The trial court, after receiving the

Boise Cascade Corporation case, ruled in Child's favor,
garded the Stipulation previously entered.

and disre-

The trial court deter-

mined the Boise Cascade Corporation case to be controlling in this
matter, and therefore awarded Child its priority over the Trust Deed
of the appellant.
dent, Child,

The ruling of the trial court awarding the respon-

priority over the appellant should be sustained.
POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED
THE CROSSCLAIMS OF CHILD BROTHERS, INC.,
WITHOUT A TRIAL OR HEARING.

Motions for Summary Judgment as to the oriority of the lien
claims against the property had been made and argued on January 12,
1978.

The trial court thereafter, on January 24,

1978, awarded the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lien claimants priority over the appellant.

The attorney for Child

telephoned the trial court clerk on February 1, 1978, to make sure
that the trial on the Crossclaims and Counterclaims was going to be
held that day.

The Clerk informed the attorney for Child, after

having discussed the matter with the trial judge, that there would
be no trial held that day, such trial date having been vacated
because of the January 24,

1978 Order.

Contrary to the information

given to the Crossclaimant, Child, a hearing was held on February 1, 197:
at

which hearing the trial court dismissed the Crossclaim of

Child and Zundel and Mountain Springs.
Child has a valid claim against Mountain Springs for the
failure of warranty on the lots deeded to Child by Warranty Deed,
which lots were foreclosed against by the appellant.
Covenants, Sec. 50 through 55)

(20 AmJur2d

Equity demands that the clalm of

Child against Mountain Springs and Zundel be heard and not summarily
dismissed as was done by the trial court.

Child asks this court to

reverse and remand that portion of this action which deals with the
Crossclaim of Child against Zundel and Mountain Springs.
CONCLUSION
The appellant's appeal should be dismissed.

The apoellant

has received the benefits of his Judgment and has obtained all that
it desired from the sale of the property,
its Judgment in thls matter.

and all that it desired in

$44,732.86 of the $1,944,732.86 aopell-

ant bid ln at the Sheriff's Sale should immediately be caid to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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respondents, and this appeal accordingly dismissed.
The trial court determination of the lien claimants having
first priority over the Trust Deed of the apPellant should be upheld.
Child had commenced work on the subject property three months prior
to the filing of the appellant's Trust Deed, and thus, by statute,
and case law should be given first priority in this matter.
In the event that this court does not give Child first
priority over the Trust Deed of appellant.

this matter should be re-

manded to the trial court for a hearing on the failure of warranty
of the title to the lots deeded Child by Mountain Springs.
-fiURly submitted,
! '-,._
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~-,
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I
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.>,~~~
/
' _..-. . , / y"-........;
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sf. L~LOW
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At 9rney fo~ Child Brothers,
325 South- Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

~

Inc.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE
INVESTORS; and CITIBANK, N.A.
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

A F F I D A V I T

-vs-

Case No. 15696

C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES,
a limited partnership; et al.
Defendants and Respondents.
STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
COMES NOW Randy S. Ludlow, being first duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
l.

That he is the attorney for Child Brothers, Inc., and

has represented Child Brothers, Inc., throughout the entire proceedings in this matter.
2.

That on February l, 1978, he personally telephoned the

Clerk of the District Court in Farmington, Utah, to request information concerning the trial which was supposed to be held on that date
to 1determine whether or not said trial was still going to be held.
3.

That he was informed by the Clerk of the Court that that

trlal date had been vacated by the trial judge.
4.

That affiant then asked the Clerk to contact the Judge

and ask the Judge if this matter had,

in fact, been vacated.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5.

That said Clerk of the Court then contacted the Judge,

and informed Affiant that the Judge had stated that the trial that
was to be held that day had been vacated.
6.

That based upon those representations,

the affiant did

not appear in Farmington for a trial that day in this matter.
7.
did,

in fact,

That the attorney for Zundel and the attorney for FDMI
appear at the court that day,

and requested a trial be

held in this matter, upon which the trial court thereafter held trial,
and dismissed the Crossclaim and Counterclaims of the respondent and
crossclaimant, Child Brothers, Inc.
8.

That the affiant and Child Brothers, Inc., would have

appeared in court for the hearing on February l,

1978, had it not

been for the representations made to them by the Clerk of the Court.
Further affiant saith naught.
DATED this 17th day of August, 1978.

1.'<1

I

,-----

I

',A_-«1 '\,;,-- / / _

Y S. LUDLQW
'v

1
'

'

Subscribed and sworn to before me'- th-±s 17th day of August,
1978.
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My Commission
Expires:
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NOTARY PUBLIC residing at
Salt Lake City, Utah
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